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Internationalizing the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation
Juli Stensland
Worker rights1 is an increasingly prominent issue in inter-
national trade negotiations and agreements. 2 The issue has
been especially evident in recent actions by the United States.
During the 1980s, the U.S. Congress added worker rights provi-
sions to four pieces of trade-related legislation: the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP),3 the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation Act (OPIC),4 the Caribbean Basin Economic Recov-
ery Act (CBERA),5 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 19746 as
1. This Note uses the term worker rights as defined by U.S. trade legisla-
tion which includes: (1) the right of association; (2) the right to organize and
bargain collectively; (3) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compul-
sory labor; (4) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (5) accepta-
ble conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
2. See David R. Sands, Trade Negotiators Have a Full Plate; 'Kitchen
Sinkers' Pile on Side Issues, WASH. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at A12. "Trade has
become an arena in which all kinds of other issues-the environment, food
safety, labor conditions-get hashed out." Id. (quoting Alan C. Raul, former
general counsel in the U.S. Department of Agriculture).
3. The Generalized System of Preferences is part of the Trade Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. V., §§ 501-05, 88 Stat. 2066 (1975) (codified as amended
in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988)) [hereinafter GSP]. The GSP program grants
trade benefits to designated developing countries. See infra notes 74-90 and
accompanying text, for further description of the GSP.
4. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created the Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, pt.
I, ch. 2, tit. IV., § 231, as added Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, pt. I, § 105,
83 Stat. 809 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988)) [hereinafter
OPIC]. OPIC is a federally chartered and operated corporation designed to pro-
mote economic growth in developing countries by supporting U.S. private in-
vestment in such countries mainly by providing investment insurance. Id. The
Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1985 requires
OPIC to withhold assistance for projects in countries that fail to take steps to
adopt laws that extend internationally recognized worker rights. Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-204, § 5,
99 Stat. 1670 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(1) (1988)).
5. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, tit. II, sub-
tit. A, §§ 201-18, 97 Stat. 384 (1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
06 (1988)) [hereinafter CBERA]. CBERA is designed to promote economic revi-
talization and expand private sector opportunities in the Caribbean Basin re-
gion by permitting the president to grant duty-free treatment to certain
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amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 (OTCA).7 The increased attention to worker rights has
continued in the 1990s. For example, the Worker Rights and
Labor Standards Trade Act of 19948 and the Fair International
Standards in Trade Act of 19949 were both pending in 1994.
During the recent debate over the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 10 the call for an agreement that ac-
knowledged worker rights'1 resulted in a side agreement, enti-
products from beneficiary developing countries. It also connects trade benefits
to worker rights. Id. § 2702(b)(7) (Supp. II 1990).
6. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. III, ch. 1, § 301, 88 Stat.
1978, 2041 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
7. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, tit. I, subtit. C, pt. 1, § 1301(a), 102 Stat. 1164 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)) (amending Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1984)) [hereinafter OTCA]. The OTCA amends Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, by expressly designating the denial of worker rights, as defined by the
five ILO conventions, as an unreasonable trade practice. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(A).
Section 301 authorizes the United States to respond unilaterally to the denial of
labor rights as an unfair trade practice with measures that include trade sanc-
tions. Id. § 2411(a)(1), (b)(2).
8. S. 2268, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). This legislation directs the presi-
dent to seek the establishment of a working party within the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to examine the relationship of fundamental
internationally-recognized worker rights to specified articles of the GATT. Id.
9. H.R. 4710, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). This legislation requires the
inclusion of worker rights provisions and environmental standards in any trade
agreement entered into under any future trade negotiating authority. Id.
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA creates a free
trade zone among the United States, Mexico and Canada. See generally What is
Nafta?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1993, at A16 (describing the major elements of
NAFTA).
11. See, e.g., Labor: Reich Floats Idea of NAFTA Secretariat to Investigate
Alleged Labor Violations, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 740 (May 5, 1993). The
debate over NAFTA attracted various participants. Labor groups opposed
NAFTA and argued that American jobs would be transferred to Mexico where
labor costs are considerably lower. Field Hearings on H.R. 3878, The American
Jobs Protection Act, and on the Mexico Free Trade Agreement and its Impact on
American Jobs and the American Workplace, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1992)
(statement of Donald W. Riegle, senator from Michigan); Nafta Opponents Blast
Side Pacts; Call Deal "Same Bad Bush NAFTA," 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1366
(Aug. 18, 1993).
In April 1993, Labor Secretary Robert Reich announced that NAFTA would
benefit U.S. workers if labor side agreements were added. Id; see Thomas R.
Howard, Free Trade Between the United States and Mexico: Minimizing the Ad-
verse Effects on American Workers, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 507 (1992) (com-
paring the advantages of a bilateral agreement on labor between the United
States and Mexico with the disadvantages of unilateral action). For a discus-
sion of the reasons behind worker rights provisions, see infra notes 19-26 and
accompanying text.
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tled the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
("Labor Side Agreement"). 12 The goal of the Labor Side Agree-
ment is to improve labor conditions and promote the enforce-
ment of national labor laws in the United States, Mexico and
Canada.13
This Note examines previous attempts to link labor stan-
dards to trade benefits and focuses on the Labor Side Agreement
as a new development in the regulation of worker rights. Part I
explores the motivating forces behind worker rights provisions.
Part II addresses the role of the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) 14 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)15 in the regulation of international worker rights. Part
III analyzes U.S. unilateral attempts to tie worker rights to in-
ternational trade by assessing the effectiveness and identifying
the weaknesses of such unilateral action. Part IV evaluates the
NAFTA side agreement on labor cooperation as the most recent
trade legislation addressing worker rights. This Note concludes
that the Labor Side Agreement represents a promising approach
12. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-
Mex.-Can., Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1499
(1993) [hereinafter Labor Side Agreement]. Labor groups' criticism of NAFTA
extended to the Labor Side Agreement. Groups, such as the AFL-CIO, faulted
the side agreement for benefiting only corporate concerns at the expense of
worker interests. Unions Vow to Defeat NAFTA Supporters; Business Groups
Cautiously Optimistic, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1387 (Aug. 18, 1993).
13. Labor Side Agreement, supra note 12, art. 1.
14. The ILO defines basic labor rights through internationally ratified con-
ventions. The United States has signed eleven ILO conventions-seven of
which were signed prior to 1947, and most of these conventions concern the
labor rights of seafarers. See Lists of Ratification by Convention and by Country
(as of December 31, 1993), Intl. Lab. Conf., 81st Sess., Report III (Part 5), ILO,
Geneva 268 (1994). The other four conventions are ILO Convention No. 105,
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957), Id. at 140-41; ILO Convention
No. 144, Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention
(1976), Id. at 188; ILO Convention No. 147, Merchant Shipping (Minimum
Standards) Convention (1976), Id. at 191; and ILO Convention No. 160, Labour
Statistics Convention (1985), Id. at 205. The U.S. Congress has incorporated
five ILO conventions as internationally recognized worker rights in recent legis-
lation. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, art. XX, 61 Stat. pts. 5,6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT]. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is targeted to supersede the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as the arbiter of world trade in 1995.
Reich Calls for Guidelines on World Trade-Labor Practices, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 941 (June 15, 1994). "The United States has pushed for the WTO discus-
sions [on worker rights], but developing countries still resist the debate, which
they view as heavily burdened with protectionist risks." Commission Meeting
to Consider WTO Talks on Labor Standards, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 476
(Mar. 23, 1994).
1995]
MNv. J GLoBAL TRADE
to effectively link worker rights and trade benefits on a multilat-
eral level.
I. THE MOVEMENT TO LINK INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND WORKER RIGHTS
Since the early 1800s, industrialized nations have pursued
a connection between labor standards and international trade. 16
The proposals for international labor legislation especially grew
as industrialization spread during the second half of the nine-
teenth century. The push for an international forum to address
labor standards finally culminated in the 1919 Treaty of Ver-
sailles, 17 which contains the Constitution of the ILO.' 8
The forces leading to the formation of the ILO and which
continue to drive the movement for worker rights are a product
of mixed motives. First, certain parties with "altruistic" motives
support worker rights efforts. Some such proponents argue that
the development of humane working conditions is a proper for-
eign policy objective considering that in some countries labor
leaders are persecuted or killed,19 and workers are being se-
verely exploited, especially through prison and child labor.20
Other such proponents seek to funnel the economic benefits of
trade agreements to the worker and ultimately raise the
worker's standard of living.2 ' Neither group, however, seeks to
raise wages and working conditions to the level found in devel-
oped countries. 22 Instead, altruistic proponents believe that in-
ternational labor standards will ultimately empower workers
with the ability to influence their own work standards and
conditions. 23
16. For a discussion of the early pioneers of international labor legislation,
see GOTE HANSSON, SOCIAL CLAUSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11 (1983).
17. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Ger-
many (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, pt. XIII, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 195.
18. HANSSON, supra note 16, at 19.
19. Steve Charnovitz states that "[t]he torture or murder of labor leaders is
the ultimate deprivation of worker rights." Steve Charnovitz, Fair Labor Stan-
dards and International Trade, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 61, 67 (1986).
20. Id. at 68. "The denial of labor rights in Third World countries tends to
perpetuate poverty, to limit the benefits of economic development and growth to
privileged elites, and to induce social instability and political rebellion." Don J.
Pease & J. William Goold, The New GSP: Fair Trade with the Third World?, 2
WORLD POL'Y J. 351, 358 (1985).
21. Steve Charnovitz, Caribbean Basin Initiative: Setting Labor Stan-
dards, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 1991, at 54, 54.
22. FAYE LYLE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuREAu OF LABOR AFFAIRS, WORKER
RIGHTS IN U.S. POLIcY 7 (1991).
23. Id.
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Second, economic self-interest continues to fuel the move-
ment for tying trade benefits to labor standards. Advocates
claim such provisions are necessary to mitigate the economic ad-
vantages gained by trading partners who deny basic rights to
workers. 24 By denying worker rights, such as collective bargain-
ing and safe working conditions, competitors are able to lower
production costs and prices accordingly. Advocates claim that
ultimately such actions make the allocation of production across
countries less responsive to factors such as the productive char-
acteristics of labor.25 The suppression of labor rights thus inter-
feres with the beneficial properties of comparative advantage. 26
II. PAST MULTILATERAL ATTEMPTS TO LINK WORKER
RIGHTS AND TRADE: THE ILO AND GATT
Socially and economically interested groups have exerted
increasing pressure to promote international worker rights.
Historically, attempts to address labor issues were made in
prominent and developed multilateral forums, such as the ILO
and the GATT. Unfortunately, both the ILO and GATT appear
to be only partially equipped to multilaterally enforce worker
rights.
A. THE ILO
Founded in 1919, the ILO is a specialized agency within the
United Nations system responsible for labor and social issues.
The founders of the ILO explicitly recognized the relationship
between labor standards and international trade.27 The Pream-
ble of the ILO Constitution warns that "[t]he failure of any na-
24. Id. at i. One proponent states that laws which make trade conditional
upon governments' observance of worker rights "are intended to discourage the
pursuit of economic advantages that may be gained by achieving lower labor
costs through denial of basic worker rights. They may also serve to ensure that
the gains from trade are broadly distributed in national economies." Id. at 7.
25. Peter Dorman, Worker Rights and International Trade: A Case for In-
tervention, 20 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 241, 243-44 (1988). Dorman writes
that "[i]n principle, tariffs which exactly offset the unit labor cost differentials
attributable to variations in worker rights would be required to restore the effi-
ciency properties of trade." Id. at 244.
26. Comparative advantage is an economic doctrine first developed by
David Ricardo in 1817. See DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND TAXATION, ch. VII (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1965) (1817). The doc-
trine states that whenever countries have relative production strengths, those
countries will benefit from trade with each other if each country specializes in
the production of the good in which the country has a relative or comparative
advantage. Id. at 77.
27. HANSSON, supra note 16, at 20.
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tion to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the
way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in
their own countries."28 As part of its mission, the ILO addresses
issues including the right to work, social security, safe working
conditions and the right to an adequate standard of living. 29
The ILO system of standards have been developed through
a series of conventions 30 which ILO members have the option of
ratifying.31 The number of ratifying countries to an ILO conven-
tion ranges from 132 to 135. 33 Members are under no obligation
to implement conventions which they have not ratified. 34 In ad-
dition, ILO members' right to file a complaint is granted only if a
country believes that another member is not complying with a
convention that both have ratified.35 Specifically, Article 26(4)
of the ILO Constitution authorizes the Governing Body to initi-
ate the complaints procedure "either of its own motion or on re-
ceipt of a complaint from a delegate to the Conference." 36 Since
1980, numerous complaints have been filed 37 including claims
against Sweden, 38 Poland,39 South Africa, 40 Romania, 41 Libyan
28. ILO CONST. pmbl.
29. ILO CONST. Annex III.
30. As of December 1993, there were 173 ILO conventions in existence. See
Lists of Ratification by Convention and by Country, supra note 14.
31. JAMES AVERY JOYCE, WORLD LABOUR RIGHTS AND THEIR PROTECTION 26
(1980).
32. ILO Convention No. 76, Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Con-
vention (1946), Lists of Ratification by Convention and by Country, supra note
14, at 99. Australia is the only signatory to this convention. Id.
33. ILO Convention No. 29, Forced Labour Convention (1930), Lists of Rat-
ification by Convention and by Country, supra note 14, at 47-49.
34. JoYcE, supra note 31, at 26.
35. HANSSON, supra note 16, at 21. Article 26(1) of the ILO Constitution
grants a right to any Member "to file a complaint with the International Labour
Office if it is not satisfied that any other Member is securing the effective obser-
vance of any Convention which both have ratified." ILO CONST. art. 26, cl. 1.
36. ILO CONST. art. 26, cl. 4.
37. For further discussion of past complaints with the ILO and the sur-
rounding process, see E. OSIEKE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 221-36 (1985).
38. 75 INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, OFFICIAL BULLETIN 6 (1992).
39. This claim was referred to a Commission of Inquiry. 66 INT'L LABOUR
OFFICE, OFFICIAL BULLETIN 135 (1983). For a description of the Commission of
Inquiry and its operating procedures, see OSIEKE, supra note 37, at 221-36.
40. 71 INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, OFFICIAL BULLETIN 153 (1988).
41. 72 INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, OFFICIAL BULLETIN 104 (1989). This claim
was referred to a Commission of Inquiry. 73 INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, OFFICIAL
BULLETIN 4 (1990).
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Arab Jamahiriya,42 Panama,43 Nicaragua,44 the Dominican Re-
public and Haiti.45
The Governing Body of the ILO can respond to a complaint
by designating a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the com-
plaint and compile a report on the matter. 46 If a government
objects to the recommendations of the report, the government
can refer the matter to the International Court of Justice,47
whose decision is final.4 8
Although the ILO is an effective standards-setting body, its
ability to enforce labor standards is limited. First, a member is
under no obligation to implement a convention which it has not
ratified. 49 The large number of ILO conventions with a small
number of signatories thus limits the application of labor stan-
dards on a worldwide basis. In addition, although the ILO
monitors compliance of the conventions, the complaint process is
not designed to apply economic sanctions.50 There is only an un-
derstanding that ratifying countries will comply.51 The ILO
thus relies primarily on moral and political pressure to promote
worker rights.52
42. 69 INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, OFFICIAL BULLETIN 135 (1986).
43. 66 INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, OFFICIAL BULLETIN 123 (1983).
44. This complaint was eventually referred to a Commission of Inquiry. 73
INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, OFFICIL4l BULLETIN 6 (1990).
45. These matters were eventually referred to a Commission of Inquiry. 65
INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, OFFICIAL BULLETIN 101 (1982).
46. ILO CONST. art. 26, cl. 3.
47. ILO CONST. art. 29, cl. 2. The International Court of Justice is designed
as an international court to settle legal disputes between states. Charter of the
United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Ju~tice, June 26,
1945, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1031, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1186. Only states may be
parties in cases before the court. Id. art. 34, 59 Stat. at 1059, 3 Bevans at 1186.
The court consists of 15 judges qualified to hold the highest judicial office in
their own countries or recognized as experts in international law. Id. art. 2, 59
Stat. at 1055, 3 Bevans at 1179. The General Assembly and the Security Coun-
cil proceed independently to elect the members of the court. Id. art. 8, 59 Stat.
at 1056, 3 Bevans at 1180. All member states of the United Nations are auto-
matically parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Id. art.
35, 59 Stat. at 1059-60, 3 Bevans at 1186. States that are not members of the
United Nations may become parties to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. Id.
48. ILO CONST. art. 31.
49. OSIEKE, supra note 37, at 221.
50. Id. at 235.
51. LYLE, supra note 22, at 2.
52. Id. Lance Compa states that "the moral force of the ILO in the world
community can bring reforms through public embarrassment of a violator."
Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade, 25
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165, 179 (1993).
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Due to the lack of a strong enforcement mechanism, the ILO
remains a standards-setting body focused on improving interna-
tional working conditions. 53 The standard-setting function of
the ILO should not, however, be dismissed. The development of
broad-based international standards is important in efforts to
improve global working conditions. The United States, for ex-
ample, relies on ILO conventions, including conventions that the
United States itself has not ratified, to develop labor standards
to which U.S. trade benefits are linked. 54 The weaknesses of the
ILO nevertheless have turned efforts to reach international
agreement on worker rights toward the GATT.
B. THE GATT
Although the GATT is the primary instrument of interna-
tional trade regulation, the GATT has just one provision con-
necting fair labor standards to trade benefits. 55 GATT Article
XX(e) allows a member country to restrict the importation of
products produced by prison labor.56 Since no other exceptions
to the general free trade policies of the GATT are allowed for
labor standards, countries are prohibited from restricting im-
ports based on other worker rights criteria.
Recently, there has been a movement to insert a "social
clause" into the GATT to permit countries to restrict imports
where basic worker rights have been violated.57 At the Prepara-
tory Committee meeting of the GATT in June 1986, the United
States requested that other contracting parties consider ad-
dressing worker rights in the GATT. 5s Despite those efforts, the
introduction of a social or labor clause into the GATT has been
strongly opposed.5 9 The issue of international labor standards
53. JOYCE, supra note 31, at 32.
54. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. European Commissioner
for External Economic Affairs Sir Leon Brittan disagrees with the U.S. push for
international labor standards. Brittan Warns of Protectionist Risk in Mixing
Trade with Labor, Environment, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 92 (Jan. 19, 1994).
Brittan believes that the responsibility for setting international labor standards
rests with the ILO and its conventions-"many of which the United States has
strangely not ratified." Id. Brittan sees the idea of asking developing countries
to apply a U.S. labor standard as "unreasonable" and asks whether the idea is
simply "a disguised form of protectionism." Id.
55. GATT, supra note 15, art. XX(e).
56. Id.
57. Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on
the World Trading Regime, 126 Ilr'L LAB. REV. 565, 565 (1987).
58. Id. (citing GATT doc. PREP.COM(86) W/43, June 25, 1986).
59. Id.
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was discussed again in the World Trade Organization6 ° Prepar-
atory Committee but to no avail. 61
Developing countries have been the most staunch opponents
to adding a worker rights provision to the GATT. Developing
countries are especially reluctant to allow developed countries to
set global labor standards which they perceive to be dominated
by protectionist motives.6 2 They view labor regulation as a de-
vice aimed at nullifying their primary advantage-low cost la-
bor.63 Developing countries are also wary that the imposition of
international labor standards may infringe on their national
sovereignty.6 If worker rights were to enter a multilateral fo-
rum, such as the GATT, developing countries fear that they
would eventually lose the power to set their own domestic labor
standards. For example, a few developed countries could domi-
nate negotiations, resulting in labor standards that would not
accurately reflect working conditions on a global scale. A regula-
tion which may be effective in benefiting U.S. workers may be
inapplicable or even detrimental to workers in a developing
country because of economic, sociological, and cultural differ-
ences. 65 These concerns have led to a stalemate in the process to
enact a labor clause as part of the GATT.
III. U.S. UNILATERAL ATTEMPTS TO LINK WORKER
RIGHTS AND TRADE: EFFECTIVENESS,
WEAKNESSES, AND LEGALITY
The absence of a labor clause in the GATT and the difficulty
of enforcing ILO labor standards have provided an impetus for
the United States to unilaterally link worker rights to trade ben-
efits. At the 1987 conference of the ILO, then-U.S. Labor Secre-
tary William Brock warned that there was a danger of U.S.
60. The World Trade Organization is expected to supersede the GAIT in
1995. Reich Calls for Guidelines on World Trade-Labor Practices, supra note
15.
61. Id. The United States initiated the discussion of international labor
standards at the April Marrakesh Conference for the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Preparatory Committee. Id. U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich also
raised the issue at the ILO annual conference on June 9, 1994. Id.
62. R. Niels Marquardt, Why Worker Rights?, 65 FOREIGN SERVICE J. 25, 25
(1988).
63. Charnovitz, supra note 57, at 565.
64. Marquardt, supra note 62, at 25.
65. See James P. Kelleher, The Child Labor Deterrence Act: American Uni-
lateralism and the GATT, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 161, 181 (1994) (discussing
how concepts of roles for family members vary widely across cultures making it
problematic to establish a norm based on a particular concept of family).
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unilateral action on worker rights and trade unless the subject
could be addressed in an international forum.66 Brock stated
that the United States had been blocked from having worker
rights discussed in the early stages of the Uruguay Round,67 and
had fared no better in the ILO. At the ILO assembly, Brock
remarked:
When we have raised the issue in the ILO, we have been told: that is a
GATT issue .... [I]f we cannot discuss worker rights in the ILO and
we cannot discuss it in GATT, no one should be terribly surprised to
see unilateral efforts to encourage respect for worker rights.
68
Frustrated with their inability to promote worker rights in
a multilateral context, the United States has acted unilaterally.
Recent U.S. trade-related legislation that contains worker rights
provisions include: GSP,69 OPIC,7° CBERA,7 1 and Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended by the OTCA.7 2 GSP deter-
minations provide the best example of U.S. unilateral action in
the area of worker rights considering the influence that GSP de-
terminations have had on similar CBERA and OPIC decisions.7 3
66. U.S. Proposal to Bring Worker Rights Issues Up at GATT Council
Draws Cautious Response, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 942 (July 22, 1987).
67. The Uruguay Round agreement was concluded in December 1993 after
more than seven years of negotiations under the GATT. Trade Negotiations
Turn Eastward, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 102 (Jan. 19, 1994).
68. U.S. Proposal to Bring Worker Rights Issues Up at GATT Council
Draws Cautious Response, supra note 66.
69. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66. See infra notes 74-90 and accompanying text for
further description of the GSP.
70. 22 U.S.C. § 2191.
71. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06.
72. 19 U.S.C. § 2411. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) Act also contains a worker rights provision. MIGA Enabling Statute,
Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 101(e), tit. I, 101 Stat. 1329-131, 1329-134 (1987) (codi-
fied as amended in 22 U.S.C. §§ 290k to 209k-1l (1988)). As an affiliate of the
World Bank, MIGA provides guarantees to foreign investors against losses
caused by non-commercial risks. World Bank Investment Promotion Agency to
Guarantee 10 Projects This Year, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1376 (Sept. 12, 1990).
The MIGA Act contains a worker rights provision, but lacks the specific focus
and the practical enforceability of the other provisions. The Act requires the
U.S. Director to oppose the issuance of guarantees to countries that have not
afforded internationally recognized worker rights; however, the Act provides
that other member countries may disagree with the U.S. Director's actions. 22
U.S.C. §§ 290k-2, 290k-3. Therefore, the MIGA Act does not operate with the
same unilateral force as the other provisions and in practice only serves to iden-
tify worker rights violations.
73. Of the U.S. trade laws requiring compliance with internationally recog-
nized worker rights, the "most effective has been the Generalized System of
Preferences Act (GSP)." Terry Coilingsworth et al., Time for a Global New
Deal, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 8, 12. See LYLE, supra note 22, at 10,
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A. GSP
The GSP program grants nonreciprocal duty-free tariff
treatment to the vast majority of exports from designated "bene-
ficiary developing countries." 74 In determining whether to des-
ignate a developing country as a beneficiary country, the United
States initially considers factors such as the level of economic
development of the country, including its per capita gross na-
tional product, and whether the country has attempted to reduce
trade distorting investment practices. 75 In 1984, the GSP Re-
newal Act 76 expanded the criteria to include a worker rights pro-
vision.77  The provision states: "[Tihe President shall not
designate any country a beneficiary developing country under
this section . . . if such country has not taken or is not taking
steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to work-
ers in the country."78
The GSP statute defines "internationally recognized worker
rights" using five ILO conventions 79 that establish: (1) freedom
of association;80 (2) the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively;8 ' (3) a prohibition on the use of forced and compulsory
labor;8 2 (4) a minimum age for the employment of children;83
74. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988). "A beneficiary developing country' means
any country with respect to which there is in effect an Executive order or Presi-
dential proclamation by the President of the United States designating such
country as a beneficiary country" for the purposes of the GSP. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2462(a)(1).
75. For a complete list of the factors used to determine whether a country
qualifies for GSP benefits, see 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c).
76. Pub. L. No. 98-573, tit. V, §§ 501-08, 98 Stat. 3018 (1984) (codified at
U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988)).
77. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4).
78. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7).
79. Congress relies on ILO-defined international worker rights even when
it has not ratified such conventions. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4).
80. ILO Convention No. 11, Right of Association Convention (1921), Lists of
Ratification by Convention and by Country, supra note 14, at 19-20. The right
of association has been defined as the right of workers and employers to estab-
lish and join organizations of their own choosing without previous authoriza-
tion; to draw up their own constitutions and rules, elect their representatives,
and formulate their programs; to join in confederations and affiliate with inter-
national organizations; and to be protected against dissolution or suspension by
administrative authority. LYLE, supra note 22, at 20.
81. ILO Convention No. 98, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining
Convention (1949), Lists of Ratification by Convention and by Country, supra
note 14, at 129-30. The right to organize and bargain collectively is, for exam-
ple, the right of workers to be represented in labor negotiations and to be pro-
tected against interference with union activities. LYLE, supra note 22, at 22.
82. ILO Convention No. 105, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention
(1957), Lists of Ratification by Convention and by Country, supra note 14, at
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and (5) the right to a minimum wage and maximum work
week.8 4 GSP regulations require that a country respect these
five worker rights in order to retain its GSP benefits.8 5
In the event that a country is not according these worker
rights, the GSP statute is equipped with an enforcement proce-
dure. GSP regulations permit any person or party, on an annual
basis, to "file a request to have the GSP status of any eligible
beneficiary developing country reviewed with respect to any of
the designation criteria."86 In the annual GSP review process,
labor and human rights groups may petition for the removal of
benefits from countries with alleged worker rights violations.87
Since worker rights were added to the GSP selection criteria in
1984, thirty-four countries have been reviewed88 for their
140-41. Forced labor is defined as work exacted from any person under the
threat of penalty and for which the person has not volunteered. LYLE, supra
note 22, at 24.
83. ILO Convention No. 138, Minimum Age Convention (1973), Lists of
Ratification by Convention and by Country, supra note 14, at 181-82.
84. ILO Convention No. 1, Hours of Work (Industry) Convention (1919), id.
at 3; ILO Convention No. 131, Minimum Wage Fixing Convention (1970), id. at
173. Although the United States has signed the Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention, the United States is not a signatory to the other four ILO conven-
tions. Besides the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, the United States is
a signatory to 10 other ILO conventions: Officers' Competency Certificates Con-
vention, 1936; Holidays with Pay (Sea) Convention, 1936; Shipowners' Liability
(Sick and Injured Seamen) Convention, 1936; Hours of Work and Manning
(Sea) Convention, 1936; Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936; Certi-
fication of Able Seamen Convention, 1946; Final Articles Revision Convention,
1946; Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention,
1976; Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976; Labour Sta-
tistics Convention, 1985. Id. at 268.
85. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7).
86. Regulations of the USTR Pertaining to Eligibility of Articles and Coun-
tries for the Generalized System of Preference Program, 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0(b)
(1993).
87. The AFL-CIO, for example, filed seven worker rights petitions with the
office of the United States Trade Representative on June 1, 1988. AFL-CIO,
LABOR RIGHTS AND TRADE: A PROGRESS REPORT TO THE AFL-CIO COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, February 20, 1989 (on file with the Minnesota Journal
of Global Trade). In August 1988, the U.S. Administration decided that of these
complaints, the complaints against Burma, Malaysia, Haiti, and Syria should
be investigated to determine whether their GSP benefits should be withdrawn.
Id. Petitions that were also accepted for review were against Israel from the
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and Liberia from the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights. Id. Petitions rejected were those filed against El
Salvador from Americas Watch and Guatemala from the International Labor
Rights Education and Research Fund. Id.
88. The following countries have been reviewed under the GSP program as
a result of allegations of labor violations: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Burma,
Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
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worker rights record.8 9 As a result of these reviews, three coun-
tries' GSP benefits have been terminated. 90 Despite the serious
ramifications of a negative review, the effectiveness of the GSP
worker rights provision has been questioned.
B. WEAKNESSES OF THE GSP WORKER RIGHTS PROVISION
The GSP worker rights provision provides that as long as a
country is "taking steps" toward affording internationally recog-
nized rights to its workers, benefits will not be denied to that
country.9 ' The provision has been criticized for being overly
vague, susceptible to political manipulation and offensive to the
GATT.
1. Vagueness and Political Manipulation
The vague nature of the GSP "taking steps" standard was
addressed in a recent legal challenge to the GSP worker rights
provision. In 1990, twenty-three plaintiffs, consisting of labor
unions and human rights groups, filed suit against the U.S. gov-
ernment alleging failure to enforce the worker rights provision
of the GSP statute.92 The complaint alleged that the U.S. gov-
ernment had not conducted any meaningful investigation since
1985 to assess whether countries designated prior to the amend-
ment met the requisite worker rights standards. 93 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint
Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Israel, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mauritania, Nepal, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Romania, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey.
GSP OFFICE, U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES COUNTRY PRACTICES
PETITIONS THROUGH MAY 1994 1-5 (July 5, 1994).
89. Panama's 1992 review provides an example of the GSP review process.
GSP INFORMATION CENTER, WORKER RIGHTS REVIEW SUMMARY, CASE: 011-CP-
92, PANAMA (July 1993). The Worker Rights Review Summary for Panama
stated that the 1992 review was a continuation of a previous review to monitor
the right to organize and collectively bargain, as well as monitor freedom of
association in Panama. Id. Because the laws at issue were either repealed,
amended or had lapsed, the GSP Subcommittee recommended that Panama be
found to be "taking steps" to afford worker rights-thus maintaining Panama's
GSP status. Id.
90. GSP OFFICE, supra note 88, at 3-4. Nicaragua, Romania and Liberia
have been removed from the GSP program due to worker rights violations. Id.
91. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7).
92. Int'l Lab. Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 495
(D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
93. Id. at 496.
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for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.94
The Court held that presidential GSP decisions could not be re-
viewed because of the "apparent total lack of standards" in the
GSP provision and "the President's special and separate author-
ity in the areas of foreign policy."9 5
Arguably, the "taking steps" language of the GSP provision
is purposely vague to give the executive branch a tool with
which to negotiate solutions to worker rights violations.96 The
broad language may also be designed to provide the flexibility
necessary in applying labor standards to the variety of social
and economic conditions that exist worldwide. 97 However, the
lack of judicial review98 and vague standards in the GSP pro-
gram have combined to insulate the executive branch in its en-
forcement of the worker rights provision.99 Critics also suggest
that this permits political considerations to heavily influence
GSP determinations.
Commentators criticize the GSP worker rights provision be-
cause of the broad discretionary power' 0" it delegates to the ex-
ecutive branch. 1"' They argue that the executive is free to
include political considerations in the review and determination
94. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. Int'l Lab.
Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming
dismissal on ground of non-justiciability).
95. Int'l Lab. Rights Educ. & Research Fund, 752 F.Supp. at 497.
96. See 133 CONG. REC. H1499 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1987) (statement of Rep.
Pease).
97. See Kelleher, supra note 65, at 181.
98. Int'l Lab. Rights Educ. & Research Fund, 752 F.Supp. at 497.
99. See id.
100. Presidential discretion originates from two different aspects of the
GSP. First, the President has discretion on whether to act on USTR findings of
worker rights violations. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a). Second, the "taking steps" lan-
guage of the GSP statute is vague and allows for substantial leeway in interpre-
tation. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7); see supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
101. The manner in which GSP's provisions are interpreted and adminis-
tered determines the direction of the GSP program.
If left unchecked, [the] President... would be in a position to steer the
program far away from its stated purpose of helping [less developed
countries] become more competitive in international trade. In particu-
lar, those portions of the Renewal Act that allow the President to ex-
change GSP benefits for market access in recipient countries could
turn the GSP into an instrument of economic blackmail.
Pease & Goold, supra note 20, at 360. For discussions criticizing the discretion-
ary nature of the GSP, see PETER DoRMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, WORKER RIGHTS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (1989); Harlan
Mandel, Note, In Pursuit of the Missing Link: International Worker Rights and
International Trade?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 443 (1989); LYLE, supra note
22.
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process which are unrelated to the improvement of working con-
ditions. 10 2 The problem with a politically motivated process,
however, is not that the process indiscriminately punishes coun-
tries with worker rights violations; the problem is that it allows
politically-favored countries to escape sanctions. Although peti-
tions have been filed against El Salvador and Guatemala almost
every year, Nicaragua, Romania, and Liberia 10 3 are the only
countries with their benefits currently revoked under the worker
rights provision. 10 4 One commentator observes that "although
labor conditions in Nicaragua and Romania are undoubtedly ob-
jectionable, they are probably among the least repressive of the
states against which petitions were filed."' 05 In addition to alle-
gations of political manipulation, there also have been criticisms
that the unilateral use of the GSP worker rights provision of-
fends the GATT.
2. Unilateral Worker Rights Provisions and Consistency with
the GATT
Nondiscrimination and multilateralism are two of the fun-
damental principles governing the GATT.106 Nondiscrimination
102. Mandel, supra note 101, at 470-71. Mandel writes that "an administra-
tion that is not committed to improvements in foreign worker rights . . .can
simply deem cosmetic and ineffective policy changes by oppressive governments
sufficient to qualify as 'taking steps' to afford worker rights." Id. at 471.
103. GSP OFFICE, supra note 88, at 3-4. Nicaragua, Romania, and Liberia
are the only countries whose benefits have been revoked for their worker rights
record. Id.
104. Id. In December 1987, the USTR also suspended Chile from the GSP
program. President Reagan Suspends Chile's GSP Status In Response To Its
Worker Rights Violations, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 10 (Jan. 6, 1988). The
USTR's decision to delay suspension of Chile fit with U.S. policy towards Chile
at the time. With regard to the U.S. policy towards Chile, Peter Dorman
comments:
[Ilt is clear that there was, at a minimum, ex post integration of policy.
The United States government put pressure on Chile in a variety of
ways following the coalescence of center and left parties behind a pro-
gram for a return to democracy. These include[d] public statements by
the President, the Secretary of State, and other prominent individuals,
abstentions or even negative votes for credit assistance to Chile in the
World Bank, financial assistance to opposition groups through the Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy, and moves to distance the United
States from Chile in diplomatic and military affairs.
DORMAN, supra note 101, at 14. For further discussion of the suspension of
Chile from GSP status, see Paul H. Adams, Note, Suspension of Generalized
System of Preferences from Chile-The Proper Use of a Trade Provision?, 23
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 501 (1989).
105. Mandel, supra note 101, at 464 (comparing Amnesty International re-
ports for Nicaragua and Guatemala).
106. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 23 (1979).
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requires that all contracting parties apply duties and similar
charges on the importation of goods without regard to the coun-
try of origin of the goods.' 0 7 Multilateralism requires that the
conditions of trade be agreed upon by consensus.' 0 Both of
these ideals, however, are endangered by the unilateral use of
worker rights provisions.
The principle of nondiscrimination is expressly provided for
in the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Clause of GATT Article
1.109 MFN requires that any benefit granted to one country be
extended to all other countries immediately and
unconditionally.
The GATT system was premised on the notion that.., all countries
stood to gain from increased trade. It intended that the rules of inter-
national trade would be built on a multilateral basis . .. [and] it as-
sumed that the rules would be applied evenhandedly, without
discrimination against, or favoritism for, a few. The faith was that the
major economies would abide by the rules, [and] police them .... as
might be required to keep the system together. 110
In an effort to meet the special financial and trade needs of
developing countries, the contracting parties to the GATT ap-
proved a waiver to GATT Article I in 1971.111 Commonly known
as the Enabling Clause, the waiver allows contracting parties to
accord more favorable tariff treatment to products imported
from developing countries. 112 The Enabling Clause is what "en-
ables" the United States to provide preferential tariff treatment
under the GSP program. The favorable treatment provided by
the Enabling Clause is a significant deviation from the principle
of nondiscrimination. Although it allows a nation to distinguish
between developed and developing countries, the Enabling
Clause does not appear to provide for any selectivity in accord-
ing GSP privileges between developing countries. 113
U.S. selectivity among developing countries as part of the
GSP program thus has serious implications. The denial of GSP
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause provision of GATT requires that
'any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party
to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other contracting parties." GA1I, supra note 15, art. I.
110. Zysman & Cohen, Double or Nothing: Open Trade and Competitive In-
dustry, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 1113, 1129 (1983).
111. Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, 26th Supp. BISD 203 (1980).
112. Id. para. 1.
113. See id.
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benefits does not simply return a developing country to its sta-
tus before the preference. In fact, the denied country is now at a
disadvantage vis-d-vis other developing countries. Before the
GSP benefits, all less developed countries were on a level play-
ing field at least with regard to tariff levels. Now, however, the
denied country incurs the standard U.S. tariff while its competi-
tors are subject to a lower GSP tariff. Therefore, the implica-
tions of being denied GSP benefits for violations of worker rights
provisions are equally as harmful as any other discriminatory
trade restriction. More importantly, U.S. selectivity in the GSP
program offends the GATT's fundamental principle of
nondiscrimination.
In addition to nondiscriminatory treatment, multilateralism
requires that the conditions and terms of trade reflect a consen-
sus among trading partners. 114 Multilateral agreements are
preferable to unilateral actions for several reasons. First, uni-
lateral worker rights provisions violate the rights of sovereign
states to determine their internal policies. 115 Second, multilat-
eral agreements prevent a single nation from determining what
worker rights are "fair" to provide. 116 For example, Steve
Charnovitz asks "what if Japan were to restrict imports from
countries that do not provide lifetime employment."117 Labor
standards should vary across countries to reflect various cul-
tural and economic differences. A single nation dictating a sin-
gle standard to apply to differing and complex situations may
well lead to inappropriate standards.
Finally, unilateral action provides countries such as the
United States wide discretion in awarding trade preferences.
The political relationship between the United States and an-
other country, for instance, is able to influence the future of that
country's trade benefits."18 Again, the U.S. GSP program of-
fends the GATT's fundamental principle of multilateralism.
Multilateral agreements incorporating nondiscrimation princi-
ples are therefore more likely to achieve a less discretionary and
more effective regulatory framework for international worker
rights.
114. LOWENFELD, supra note 106, at 23.
115. Marquardt, supra note 62, at 25.
116. Charnovitz, supra note 19, at 75.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT: A COOPERATIVE,
MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO PROMOTING
WORKER RIGHTS
The U.S. multilateral and unilateral attempts to link
worker rights to trade benefits have had limited success. The
multilateral attempts have not been effective due to the ILO's
lack of a strong enforcement mechanism and the unwillingness
of the GATT contracting parties to incorporate a worker rights
provision. Moreover, U.S. unilateral action has been criticized
as politically motivated and offensive to the fundamental princi-
ples of the GATT. The NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, however,
represents a multilateral attempt that draws on certain benefits
of each type of action while avoiding some of their more signifi-
cant weaknesses.
A. THE LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT
The labor principles outlined in the Labor Side Agreement
"indicate broad areas of concern where the Parties have devel-
oped, each in its own way, laws, regulations, procedures and
practices that protect the rights and interests of their respective
workforces."119 Although the Labor Side Agreement mentions
certain labor principles, such as the five ILO conventions dis-
cussed previously, 120 they are not meant to establish common
minimum standards for each country's domestic law. 121 Rather
than unilaterally imposing such labor standards on other coun-
tries, the Labor Side Agreement concentrates on enforcing each
country's existing domestic laws.
119. Labor Side Agreement, supra note 12, Annex 1 (emphasis added).
120. Id. For a description of the five internationally recognized worker
rights, see supra notes 80-84. A controversial aspect of the Labor Side Agree-
ment is that not all areas of domestic labor law are subject to dispute resolu-
tion; for example, the Labor Side Agreement does not mention the rights of
association, organizing and bargaining in connection with its enforcement
mechanism. See Labor Side Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 27, 49.
121. Labor Side Agreement, supra note 12, Annex 1. The agreement states:
Affirming full respect for each Party's constitution, and recognizing the
right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and
to adopt or modify accordingly its labor laws and regulations, each
Party shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high
labor standards, consistent with high quality and productivity work-
places, and shall continue to strive to improve those standards in that
light.
Id. art. 2; see Negotiator Says Labor Side Agreement to NAFTA Provides Effec-
tive Oversight, 10 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1399 (Aug. 25, 1993).
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The Labor Side Agreement exerts pressure on each govern-
ment to explicitly outline their labor policies and enforce those
standards.122 Article 3 of the Labor Side Agreement states that
"[e]ach Party shall promote compliance with and effectively en-
force its labor law through appropriate government action."123
Private action and procedural guarantees are also addressed in
the Labor Side Agreement: "Each Party shall ensure that per-
sons with a legally recognized interest under its law in a partic-
ular matter have appropriate access to administrative ... [or]
judicial . . .tribunals for the enforcement of the Party's labor
law."1
2 4
The Labor Side Agreement establishes a Commission for
Labor Cooperation 125 which is comprised of a Ministerial Coun-
cil and a Secretariat.1 26 The Council is composed of labor minis-
ters from the United States, Canada and Mexico. 127 It meets at
least once a year to develop recommendations for and oversee
the implementation of the Labor Side Agreement.128 The Secre-
tariat assists the Council in its functions and prepares reports
on various issues related to the implementation and enforce-
ment of labor laws.' 29
The Commission is also assisted by the National Adminis-
trative Office (NAO) of each country. 130 The NAO serves as a
"point of contact" with the governmental agencies of each Party,
the other Parties' NAOs, and the Secretariat. 13' In addition,
each NAO provides for the submission of "public communica-
122. Labor Side Agreement, supra note 12, art. 1(g).
123. Id. art. 3. With regard to appropriate government action, the Labor
Side Agreement specifically mentions such issues as monitoring compliance and
investigating suspected violations, and timely proceedings to seek appropriate
sanctions or remedies for violations of its labor law. Id.
124. Id. art. 4. Article 5 of the Labor Side Agreement provides for proce-
dural guarantees such as compliance with due process of law, impartial tribu-
nal, timely decisions in writing, and proceedings open to the public "except
where the administration of justice otherwise requires." Id. art. 5.
125. This Commission does not negotiate standards in a formal sense. How-
ever, it "is a mechanism for learning more about improving labor standards,
which could be a setting for improvements across the three countries." Negotia-
tor Says Labor Side Agreement to NAFTA Provides Effective Oversight, supra
note 121.
126. Labor Side Agreement, supra note 12, art. 8.
127. Id. art. 9.
128. Id. arts. 9, 10.
129. Id. arts. 13(1), 14.
130. Id. art. 15.
131. Id. art. 16(1).
1995] 159
MIN. J GLOBAL TRADE
tions on labor law matters arising in the territory of another
Party."132
The Labor Side Agreement emphasizes the use of consulta-
tions in resolving conflicts covered by the agreement. 133 How-
ever, if the matter is not resolved through consultations between
NAOs or at the ministerial level, any Party may ask for an Eval-
uation Committee of Experts (ECE) to analyze the matter in a
non-adversarial manner.' 34 The ECE is normally comprised of
three members which are independent of any Party. 135 After an
ECE final report is presented to the Ministerial Council, any
Party may request additional consultations with another
Party.136 A special session of the Council can be requested only
after the disputing Parties fail to resolve the matter and an Ar-
bitral Panel can only be convened by a two-thirds vote of the
Council. 13 7
Dispute settlement panels 38 are to be invoked if a Party
believes that "there has been a persistent pattern of failure" by
another Party to effectively enforce their domestic labor stan-
dards.' 39 Based on the submissions and arguments of the dis-
puting Parties, 40 the Panel presents an initial report.' 41 A
disputing Party can submit written comments on the initial re-
port.142 After considering any such comments, the Panel
132. Id. art. 16(3).
133. Id. art. 20. Article 20 states: "The Parties shall at all times endeavor
to agree on the interpretation and application of this Agreement, and shall
make every attempt through cooperation and consultations to resolve any mat-
ter that might affect its operation." Id.
134. Id. art. 23.
135. Id. art. 24.
136. Id. art. 27.
137. Id. arts. 28, 29.
138. Where there are two disputing parties, the panel shall be comprised of
five members. Id. art. 32. The disputing parties must agree on the chairperson
of the panel and then each disputing party selects two panelists who are citi-
zens of the other disputing party. Id. Where there are more than two disputing
parties, the five member panel shall be comprised of an agreed-upon chairper-
son and four panelists. Id. The Party complained against selects two panelists,
one of whom is a citizen of a complaining Party and the other from another
complaining Party. Id. The complaining Parties shall select two panelists who
are citizens of the Party complained against. Id. Panelists shall normally be
selected from a roster that is maintained according to Article 30. Id. arts. 30,
32.
139. Id. art. 27(1).
140. A disputing party, or the panel itself, can also request information and
expert advice. Id. art. 35.
141. Id. art. 36.
142. Id.
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presents a final report to the disputing Parties. 143 If the Panel
determines there has been a persistent pattern of failure by a
Party to enforce certain labor standards, 4 4 the disputing Par-
ties then agree on an action plan, which should conform to the
recommendations of the Panel. 145 If the disputing Parties fail to
agree on a plan or if there is a dispute as to whether the plan is
being implemented, the Panel can be reconvened. 146 To force
compliance, the Panel is equipped with the power to issue
fines 147 and, ultimately, impose trade sanctions. 148 Punitive
steps, however, are to be taken only as a last resort.149
B. THE LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT AS A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR
ADDRESSING WORKER RIGHTS
In the pursuit of addressing worker rights through trade
agreements, the Labor Side Agreement contains several signifi-
cant tools that make it a promising development. First, the La-
bor Side Agreement respects each Party's sovereignty because it
does not impose any one country's labor standards on another.
Instead, the Labor Side Agreement builds upon existing domes-
tic labor standards. 150 This approach is preferable as it pro-
motes gradual improvement of worker rights through
cooperation and participation. Historically, developing coun-
tries, such as Mexico, have feared that multilateral action ig-
nores their sovereignty by bringing excessive demands and swift
enforcement. 151 By using existing labor standards as a starting
point, however, the Labor Side Agreement does not infringe on
the sovereignty of other countries to the extent associated with
past unilateral action.
143. Id. arts. 36, 37.
144. See text accompanying supra note 139.
145. Labor Side Agreement, supra note 12, art. 38.
146. Id. art. 39(1).
147. Id. art. 39(5)(b).
148. Id. art. 41(1). Canada is exempt from NAFTA trade sanctions for non-
enforcement of its standards. In Canada, the federal court has powers to fine
federal or provincial governments if a trinational panel determines that they
have failed to enforce their own standards. Id. Annex 41A; Peter Morton &
Kelly McParland, Canada: Canada Wins Battle on Sanctions, FIN. POST, Aug.
14, 1993, at 1.
149. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the fears of developing countries, see text accompa-
nying supra notes 62-65.
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Second, the Labor Side Agreement avoids the inevitable dis-
agreement over what constitutes "fair" in labor standards.'
52
Due to the economic, sociological and cultural differences that
exist worldwide, agreements have typically struggled with the
definition of what constitutes an appropriate labor standard.'
53
By requiring that each country only enforce its existing labor
laws, the Labor Side Agreement entirely avoids the fairness
debate.
Third, the Labor Side Agreement includes a more effective
dispute settlement and enforcement process. Unlike the ILO,
the Labor Side Agreement is not without enforcement power.
Dispute settlement panels can be invoked and, if necessary,
trade sanctions imposed.' 54 Although political pressure may be
a major factor in dispute settlement due to the limited number
of parties to NAFTA, political discretion is minimized through
the use of independent committees' 55 or politically balanced
panels.' 56 Enforcement will ultimately be more effective be-
cause no government retains the politically manipulatable dis-
cretion associated with unilateral action when protecting worker
rights.
Fourth, the Labor Side Agreement makes it easier for Par-
ties to identify worker rights violations by providing greater ac-
cess to information. The Labor Side Agreement requires the
Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation to periodi-
cally prepare reports on each country's labor laws and labor
market conditions. 157 In contrast, programs such as the GSP
have been criticized due to the difficulty of accessing sufficient
information needed to prepare the detailed complaints that the
GSP regulations require. The AFL-CIO has noted that
"[p]rivate [GSP] petitioners . . . may not have the resources,
presence or access to target violators systematically." 5 8 Parties
to NAFTA, however, will be able to address the alleged viola-
tions in greater detail.
Admittedly, NAFTA is a product of a unique situation. The
Labor Side Agreement is an agreement between three neighbor-
152. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
157. Labor Side Agreement, supra note 12, art. 14.
158. AFL-CIO, supra note 87; see also Theresa A. Amato, Note, Labor Rights
Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and the International Trade
Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 109 (1990).
[Vol. 4:141
LABOR SDE A GREEMENT
ing countries with well developed labor laws already in place. 159
Thus, although the agreement provides an attractive alternative
for multilateral agreements among countries with similarly de-
veloped labor laws, it may not be broadly applicable. Still, Mex-
ico's participation in the Labor Side Agreement demonstrates
that just as developed countries can adopt protective labor stan-
dards and agree to enforce those standards, so too can develop-
ing countries. Therefore, the provisions of the Labor Side
Agreement arguably have broader application than the NAFTA
situation.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States has consistently tried to link interna-
tional trade to worker rights. U.S. attempts to act multilaterally
within the GATT and ILO have met strong opposition from de-
veloping countries concerned about their sovereignty. U.S. uni-
lateral action has also been heavily criticized and limited in its
effectiveness. Unilateral attempts not only offend the GATT's
spirit of multilateralism and nondiscrimination, but utilize
overly vague provisions that permit political considerations to
influence review and enforcement.
The Labor Side Agreement provides an alternative ap-
proach to addressing worker rights in trade agreements. The
primary advantage of this approach is the Labor Side Agree-
ment's concentration on enforcing existing domestic labors laws,
rather than unilaterally imposing labor standards. As a result,
the Labor Side Agreement avoids the inevitable disagreement
over what constitutes "fair" labor standards. The Labor Side
Agreement also improves dispute settlement and enforcement
procedures by utilizing impartial and representative settlement
159. Ron Blackwell, associate director for research for a U.S.-based union,
admits that the union "admires many aspects of labor laws in Mexico," but em-
phasizes that the laws need to be better enforced. Economist Argues Free Trade
with Mexico will Cause Adjustments in U.S. Workforce, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
784 (May 22, 1991). For a discussion of labor law in Mexico, see Ann M. Bar-
tow, Note, Mexican Labor Law from Three Perspectives: the Constitution, the
Trade Unions, and the Maquiladoras: The Rights of Workers in Mexico, 11
COMP. LAB. L.J. 182 (1990). Canada's labor laws are less controversial than
Mexico's. In Canada, employers have fewer private property protections with
respect to union organizing, union certification is quick, and the Canadian gov-
ernment is willing to intervene in the collective bargaining process. Canadian
Lawyer Says Free Trade has Not Weakened Labor Standards, Int'l Business
and Trade Daily (BNA), Feb. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Intrad Library,
BNAIBF file.
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bodies as well as providing for the power to impose economic
sanctions.
Although the Labor Side Agreement may be the product of a
unique situation, its approach to labor standard development,
dispute settlement, and enforcement should have a positive in-
fluence on future attempts to address worker rights in trade
agreements.
